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The Ethics of Love for Animals1 
 
Abstract This is an exploration of the ethics of our love for animals. The first section defends the capacity of 
animals for love, and hence to reciprocate our love for them. The second provides an overview of various attempts to 
situate the importance of love within animal ethics. The final section suggests that the most promising way to make 
the connection between love and animal ethics may be through valuing and motivation. Love is, after all, the 
paradigmatic form of valuing, the way of valuing that most obviously motivates us to live our lives in the ways that 
we do.  
 
I. The capacity of animals for love 
I will begin with the obvious, nothing works as a completely general theory of love. There are 
always exceptions and anomalies, things that do not fit. An account of love, and more specifically, 
of the ethics of love for animals, requires a degree of caution rather than a formal specification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for what the love in question involves. Nonetheless, there are 
some comparatively non-controversial things that can be said about most forms of love. For 
example, while the exact standing of love as an emotion, or as something else is disputed, there is 
a rough consensus that love is at least emotion-like in various ways.2 It is not, for example, a strictly 
cognitive response and it seems to be connected to various sorts of felt bodily experiences, or 
rather dispositions towards such experiences. Like anger, jealousy, shame and guilt, love is also 
complex. It involves several things which are not easily disentangled. My preferred list includes 
affective dispositions, desires, and (a little more controversially) a cognitive component, i.e. 
something akin to a belief or appraisal. Accordingly, while accepting that love is not exclusively 
cognitive, I will nonetheless side with those who regard love as at least partly cognitive. This links 
love strongly to emotion, and also to vision and ‘appraisal’ rather than to ‘bestowal’ and projection 
even if we also happen to be disposed to project various qualities and accomplishments onto those 
we love. (Perhaps some of us do and so of us don’t.)  
 Broadly, when we love someone we have various dispositions towards the relevant 
affective responses and actions; we desire to be with the object of our love, or at least we desire 
that who or what we love should flourish or at least not come to certain kinds of serious harm. 
We also, figuratively and sometimes literally, see them in a way that we do not ordinarily see others, 
with care and attention. These are, of course, philosophical formulations. Ways of articulating the 
desires in question. Few agents would revert to the Aristotelian language of flourishing if asked 
‘What is love?’ Rather, they would use some sort of shorthand for a more complex reality. 
 Here, I am also addressing love as a response to particular others. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will set aside love for that which goes beyond the individual: love for humanity, of the 
                                                           
1 Previously delivered as a keynote paper for the 2017 Conference of the Cumann Fealsúnachta na 
hÉreann (Irish Philosophical Society) on Humans and Other Animals held at Carlow College in 
November 2017. Thanks go to the organisers for their guidance and patience. 
2 For the special case of romantic love, and a claim that it is more of a syndrome than an emotion, 
see Arina Pismenny and Jesse Prinz, ‘Is Love an Emotion?’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Love, ed. by Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Smuts 
has also cast doubt upon the standing of love as an emotion, appealing to its duration rather than 
transitoriness and to the absence of ‘reasons for love’ in any sense that matches up with our reasons 
for emotional response See Smuts, ‘Normative Reasons for Love, Part I.’ Philosophy Compass 9 
(2014), 507-514. 
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sort that the later Kant and Gandhi considered important; love for species and types which figures 
in Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949); and loving reverence for all living things in the 
manner of Albert Schweitzer The Philosophy of Civilization (1923), and E.O.Wilson’s Biophilia (1984). 
This is not because I discount these loves. They seem, up to a point, both possible and admirable, 
even if a little overextended in Wilson’s case. Instead, they are set aside in order to focus upon the 
place where all love begins. Love of the relevant sort is by particular beings (such as you, me, and 
everyone we know) and it is directed towards other particular beings. These other particular beings 
are often, but not always, other humans.  
 There is a strong line of thought which holds that such love should or must only be directed 
towards humans. This is the kind of story that we encounter in a good deal of the analytic literature 
on love. For David Velleman, in his classic paper on ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’, love is a 
recognition of personhood in a strong, broadly Kantian sense that will exclude love for non-
humans because they are also non-persons. Yet Velleman allows that in some sense there is also a 
love (not our kind of love) which is ‘felt for many things other than the possessors of a rational 
nature’. 3 Similarly, Niko Kolodny wants to allow that there is a love for non-persons, but insists 
that the philosophically interesting kind of love is for and by people like us. A determination to 
exclude animals and situate philosophically-interesting love within the context of cognitively 
demanding inter-personal relationships which also results in the implausible exclusion of humans 
who are not yet capable of such cognitively demanding relationships. (A high price to pay to keep 
animals out of the picture.)4 Harry Frankfurt is more generous and allows that we can in some sense 
love animals but they certainly cannot love us in return. More specifically, on the Frankfurtian 
account, love requires not just desires but identification with desires, ‘a lover identifies himself with 
what he loves.’ 5 It requires something second-order, i.e. desires about desires. And such 
hierarchies of desire are something that rarely if ever characterise animal psychology. (Frankfurt 
says never, but I suspect that there may be outliers, occasional exceptions.) Here, it does not matter 
if we argue that some animals are, in fact, persons. That will simple be a terminological shift to the 
use of the concept in a less Kantian way. The point is that love is tied to the kind of beings who 
would match something close to the Kantian criteria even if there is a case for moving on from 
the latter. 
One of the many curious features of such approaches is its apriorism. The fixed 
determination to set aside a growing body of evidence for love by animals, a body of evidence that 
has accrued over the past half-century and, perhaps, just as importantly, the growing evidence for 
animal grief which has accrued over the same period.6 Here, I have shifted the discussion 
temporarily to the subject of love by animals rather than our love for them. I do this for a reason, 
because of a widespread idea that what makes other humans especially suitable as recipients of 
love is their capacity to reciprocate. The guiding thought is that love for humans is often well-
invested because there can be a return. In Troy Jollimore’s terms (and again restricting the concept 
                                                           
3 David Velleman, ‘Love as a Moral Emotion’, Ethics, 109 (1999), 45-59 (p. 365). 
4 Niko Kolodny, ‘Love as Valuing a Relationship’, Philosophical Review, 112 (2003), 135-189 (p. 137)  
5 Harry Frankfurt, Reasons of Love (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 61. 
6 Useful summaries of the research can be found in the works of ethologist such as Bekoff and de 
Waal. For example, Marc Bekoff, The Emotional Lives of Animals (California: New World Library, 
2007) and Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2017).   
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of personhood) ‘The special opportunity that love for persons affords us is the opportunity to care 
about something that can care about us.’ 7 
By contrast, any inability of animals (by which I mean, other animals) to love us will cast 
doubt upon their appropriateness as recipients of our love, and will ultimately, if indirectly, cast 
doubt upon the depth of any love that we might happen to feel for them. If such love is based 
upon anthropomorphic delusions about reciprocation, e.g. the mistaken thought that ‘she 
understands every word I say’, how deep and genuine can the love be? If the love is based upon 
delusions, then we may not love the actual animal but rather a creature who isn’t there. 
While reciprocation among humans is important to our living and faring well, I suspect 
that the exclusion of animals on this basis is misplaced, not only because we humans may love one 
another deeply, legitimately and even tragically, without reciprocation, but because many animals 
can and do return our love. (Not all, but many.) Other creatures do not, in other words, always 
lack the capacity to love. Indeed, their well-documented capacity to grieve presupposes a capacity 
to love. The two go together. We can see this from some simple reflections upon when grief is 
and is not possible. I, a human, may feel sorry for the unknown motorcyclist whose boots stick 
out from under a white sheet by the side of the road, but I cannot truly grieve for him. Rather, I 
can only grieve over the loss of things and beings with whom, and with which, I have a longer 
history of concern. There must be a history of emotional entanglement of the sort that is also 
integral to love. This leaves interesting problems about (i) love at first sight; and (ii) false grief, but 
there are ways in which they can be tackled which do not presuppose the sudden emergence of 
either love or grief as some form of emotion without history.  
 Even so, there are aspects of the hierarchical and cognitively-demanding models of love, 
such as the one set out by Harry Frankfurt (among others, e.g. Bennett Helm), which I do not 
wish to deny.8 One of these is that love is not just a matter of desires, but of desires that connect 
up to one another, and by virtue of doing so may be said to be ‘deep’. We can well understand 
why such complex connections and networks require history, why they take time to form. There 
are, however, different ways to work with this insight about interconnection. As indicated before, 
Frankfurt suggests that love requires second order-desires: we have desires for the well-being of 
the other person and we identify with those desires, we desire to have them. This will, of course, 
make grief intelligible up to a point. When someone we love dies, there is no way for our first-
order desires for their well-being to be satisfied, yet we continue to have these desires and continue to 
have second-order desires about them. We continue to want to have them. We remain caught up 
in the web until, gradually, it is reconfigured. 
 In various places I have presented a different sort of story about the interconnectedness 
of desires, a counter-picture, that will work at least as well (and arguably better) as an explanation 
of human grief but will allow for a better match-up with the evidence for animal grief. 9 The 
counter-picture draws upon the idea of conditional desires rather than second-order desires. In 
spite of the shorthand that we regularly use when explaining what we want, most if not all of our 
desires are (upon closer examination) conditional in one way or another. When we want x, what 
we actually want is to have or to enjoy x while we still want it and not, for example, after the desire 
has faded. When I want to go to Yankee Stadium for the ball game, what I actually want is to go 
                                                           
7 Troy Jollimore, Love’s Vision (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 122. On my 
understanding, Jollimore, is not trying to avoid the evidence for animal love, but simply to say 
something special about humans.  
8 Bennett Helm, Love, Friendship and the Self, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 152.  
9 Tony Milligan, ‘Animals and the Capacity for Love’, in Love and its Objects, eds. Christian Maurer, 
Kamila Pacovská and Tony Milligan, (Harmondsworth: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 211-25.  
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under specified conditions, with my wife Suzanne, with both of us faring well and not so 
preoccupied with other concerns that our enjoyment will be blocked off. When Aaron Judge hits 
a ball that is high, far and gone, I do not want to be preoccupied by data sets concerning this year’s 
student intake. Numerous folk tales capture the point: when we meet the devil at the crossroads 
and make a deal with him, what he gives us is what we say we want, but it is not what we really want. He 
gives us wealth but makes us ill, he gives us health but separates us from those we love. He delivers 
x when we actually want x and y. (Or, more plausibly, x and y1,…,yn.) What we want, when we 
want most things, can best be represented as a conjunction of circumstances, and not one single 
circumstance on its own.  
 The connectedness of circumstances that we desire is integral to both love and grief. When 
we love someone, we do not simply want them to flourish. (I want that much for strangers, 
roadside victims, tax collectors and, on occasion, political opponents.) Rather, when we love 
someone, our desires for their well-being become entangled with all sorts of other desires that we 
have. We want various things and for our loved one to be well. The result is that when our loved 
one is not well, or when we are caught up in grief over their loss, it will tend to corrupt our 
enjoyment of even the simplest of things: watching a favourite TV programme, coffee at the coffee 
shop, settling down with chocolate to watch the game against the Red Sox.  Desires concerning 
such matters, and the desire for the well-being of a loved one connect but, in grief, the desire for 
the well-being of the other person, a desire on which many other desires have become conditional, 
can no longer be satisfied. A more or less lengthy process of disentangling ensues and is only ever 
partially completed. Grief endures but in a more subdued form. Ultimately, we return to the world 
of ordinary pleasures as more burdened agents.  
 Notice the way in which the interconnectedness of desires is sustained in this counter-
picture, without the necessity for any appeal to higher-order desires. What we want may remain 
resolutely first-order, and hence accessible to a range of familiar animals. (Dogs would be one 
obvious example.) Of course, there is a good deal more that we can say about the structure of 
desires, about the way in which some desires are deeper than others because of the range of 
connections that they have and the kinds of other desires that are conditional upon their fulfilment. 
But again, a hierarchical shift is unnecessary and even when made, even when higher-order desires 
are brought into the picture in the case of humans, their conditionality still needs to be accounted 
for and does a good deal of the work. For those animals capable of developing the relevant kinds 
of networks of conditional desires, reciprocation of our love is possible. And so, even if we make 
this capacity a requirement for any being to be a suitable object of our love, love for animals will 
still not be ruled out, even if such love ordinarily feels different from our love for other humans. 
Even if it ought to feel different from such love in various ways.10  
II. Situating Love within Animal Ethics  
Why ethical theory ought to be interested in this (and interested in love of any sort) is, of course, 
a broader topic with some history and notable contributors (Plato and the later Kant being two 
examples).11 Generally, the modern version of the story told is that notions of respect, and relatedly 
of rights, do important ethical work, but they are asked to do too much work, or the wrong kind of 
work, unless love is also appealed to. Talk about rights, respect and even duty can seem cold and 
                                                           
10 There is a debt to Quine’s account of the ‘web of belief’ in this account of the interconnectedness 
of desires and something is also owed to David Pugmire’s account of emotional depth (which itself 
has acknowledged Quinean roots), Pugmire Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 39-45. 
11 Plato’s Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus are the classic sources for love as integral to ethics. Strictly, 
in The Doctrine of Virtue (1797) Kant tried to fuse the language of the impersonal and the language 
of love through the idea of duties of love.  
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impersonal. Love, on the other hand, is closer to the personal dimensions of ethics. As a point 
that owes something to Iris Murdoch, our daily lives are, in multiple ways, shaped by our love for 
others.12 Deliberation about rights often tends to be much more intermittent, akin to an 
interruption in the regular pattern of our day-to-day cares. And so, at least in those areas were 
ethics has a personal dimension and cannot simply appeal to notions of inherent value and 
universal principles, love retains an important place. 
A familiar example from Simone Weil may help to illustrate the point: a father who sells 
his daughter into prostitution would ordinarily (and justifiably) be reproached with something far 
more straightforward than a failure to respect her rights, even though such an action would not 
doubt also involve a failure to respect her rights and talk about the latter might be added as an 
afterthought.13 This has been a line of discussion picked up on especially within the Wittgensteinian 
tradition in its more impressive encounters with issues of animal ethics, with attention drawn 
towards the ways in which rights talk can soften the harsher realities of betrayal, suffering and 
animal harm into something more legalistic. Like the characters in J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Elizabeth 
Costello (2003), we can discuss ‘animal rights’ over dinner without registering a sense of moral 
horror about what is done. Meaning is, for a large class of cases, use and one use of the language 
of ‘rights’ sometimes happens to be evasion even if it is not the only use.14  
Relatedly, rights talk, does not seem to motivate in the way that love does. Most of us, 
most of the time, will do little to ensure that all of the relevant rights of fellow human agents are 
respected. Many of us will even routinely fail to assert our own rights on suitable occasions. We 
are very selective about such matters. The interconnectedness of desires which are integral to love 
then seems to contrasts with the apparent shallowness of a variety of our beliefs about which 
creatures have rights and about the kind of rights that they might actually have. (Given that they 
could not be, across the board, identical to the rights that we enjoy, and which are premised upon 
our special modes of engagement with one another. Animals could not have a right to free speech.) 
Such points about the limitations of rights talk can, of course, be pressed too far. For example, in 
ways which presuppose the very same moral psychology as theories that are overly dependent 
upon rights talk. They can presuppose a moral psychology which artificially separates beliefs and 
desires, the cognitive and the supposedly non-cognitive, and then associates rights talk too 
exclusively with the former side of the contrast. Yet beliefs too can be deep, bound into our 
identity, and therefore bound together with the complex fabric of our desires. The two do not fall 
apart. Drawing upon Weil, the limitations point has been pressed in a particularly strong manner 
in the feminist-influenced literature on animal ethics. In Kathy Rudy’s Loving Animals (2011), for 
example, there is a tendency to endorse love rather than rights, or love as a way of dispensing 
altogether with talk about rights and this seems odd or at least unintentional but misleading. It also 
has the awkward consequence that we are still permitted to eat the ones we love and they have no 
rights which might prevent this from taking place when the understanding of the love in question 
fails to do so.15 
As a point of clarification, my point here is not to run chapter-and-verse through the 
literature, but simply to highlight the difference between some familiar ways of setting love and 
                                                           
12 Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of Good (1970) is a key source for this idea. However, in her later work, 
Metephysics as a Guide to Morals (1992) she attempts to restrict love to the domain of personal moral 
pilgrimage and ethical being and to keep it apart from areas such as politics. 
13 Simone Weil, ‘Human Personality’, in Simone Weil, Selected Essays 1934-43 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), p. 21.  
14 Coetzee’s novel has become a touchstone for a good deal of these discussions. 
15 This is a guiding consideration in Kathy Rudy, Loving Animal: Towards a New Animal Advocacy. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 
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rights against one another and the position from the one that I am advocating. When I write about 
love and ethics, or love and politics, I am advocating a fuller normative pluralism within which 
love and rights can (or must) play different, if sometimes overlapping, ethical roles. Rights talk is, 
after all, one of the standard currencies of politico-legal discussion. Whatever endgame we envisage 
for animal ethics, we do still need rights talk, even if we do not need only rights talk. A different 
way of putting the point would be to say that love is part of the broader background of valuing 
without which rights talk is likely to remain a dead letter.  
But this is perhaps a little cryptic. Where precisely does love fit within this mixed picture 
where rights talk remains but is not asked to do all of the work? Precision here is possible only up 
to a point. Some aspects of the ambiguities of love talk will no doubt remain. However, one place 
where it might fit is at the juncture of ethics and politics. And here, I am thinking of something 
broadly Aristotelian, i.e. a preconditions argument. I am thinking about the ways in which we must see 
the other before a commitment to political community is at all possible. Notoriously, the Aristotelian 
political community is bound together by bonds of political friendship, by philia politike. The notion 
is elusive and a good deal of ink has been spent upon it from more liberal individualist and more 
communitarian standpoints. On the reading that I favour, what he had in mind was (minimally) 
the idea that society is made up of various interlocking clusters of social groups, and especially 
clusters of male friends who are bound to each other (but not to everyone else) by various sorts 
of philia or friendship love. To be able to fit in as a citizen, you have to be able to fit somewhere 
in relation to these interlocking groups. This means that you have to be, in some sense, seen as 
lovable, if only in some very rudimentary sense. Not by everyone but by some group of citizens. 
Without this, the very idea of pursuing a common good, the idea at the very heart of political 
community, remains empty. This is only one side of the position. Aristotle was also, no doubt, 
implying that the kinds of friendship available to us, or most readily available, might themselves 
be inflected by the kind of political system that we live in.  
Gender is, of course, was an issue in Aristotle’s way of putting matters and a problem with 
similar attempts to build fraternity into more modern models of political community. The idea 
that man-to-man might brothers be, seems to take one portion of humanity as the norm and we 
know which one. Be that as it may, there is something to the Aristotelian inclusion of love within 
the domain of the political community, and the treatment of the former as a precondition for the 
latter. More minimally, familiar attempts to situate some (not all) animals within the political 
community, e.g. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis (2011), will have nothing to fear from such a 
preconditions argument, just so long as the animals who are candidates for becoming our fellow 
citizens are well chosen. We might, however, adopt the Aristotelian argument while remaining 
officially neutral on the idea of animal citizenship or sceptical about its possibility. For clarity, I 
actually regard the latter as an interesting but ultimately utopian notion. However, to say this is not 
intended as a dismissive move because all of the great social and political movements have included 
utopian strands of thought. This is not simply because people in their aggregate are prone to 
include some who will go to extremes. It is because such utopias can function as placeholders for 
difficult-to-specify final objectives. They help us to deal with the ambiguities of our best political 
aspirations. In any case, if animals cannot actually be fellow citizens in a complex modern 
democracy, the reasons for this are not because they are unsuitable as recipients of the love, and 
even friendship, of established citizens. They will, in many cases, meet any such requirement. The 
obstacles to animal citizenship will, instead, be of a different sort.16  
                                                           
16 For a little more detail on these matters, see Milligan ‘‘The Politicization of Animal Love’, in 
E.Aaltola and J.Hadley (eds.) Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), pp. 185-200. 
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This does not, of course, rule out all forms of mixed (human/non-human) community or 
even the reasonableness of thinking of such community in thinner political terms than those of 
citizenship. The absolute limits of such shared community will then be the limits of ‘creatures we 
could love’, creatures with whom we could conceive of ourselves as having a common good rather 
than merely conflicting goods or enjoying co-existence. The practical limits of realisable 
communities will no doubt be narrower still, set by history and multiple contingencies. Beyond 
this, we will be left with the difficult challenges of recognition and valuing without the possibility 
of shared community.  
 
III.  Love and valuing  
The overall thought here is that an attitude towards others as suitable recipients of love by humans, 
or as excluded from such love, tells us something about whether or not those others (who or 
whatever they may be) are seen in ways which make the idea of a shared life of some depth possible. 
The possibility of love is, as it was for Aristotle, seen as a precondition for other possibilities. 
Although, here I use this insight in a way that he might not have approved of, as a way to think of 
what might connect human and non-human animals in deep ways, in spite of our many differences. 
But just how strong is the linkage? How far can the point be pressed? This is much harder to say. 
Against too tight a connection, we might consider that, firstly, there clearly are obviously valuable 
creatures who we cannot love in any sort of reciprocated way. Whales are an example. We cannot 
relate to them in the ways required for a reciprocated love, yet they matter too. Valuing without 
even the possibility of love cannot become an afterthought.  
Secondly, talk about human love for animals, and about our emotional responsiveness to 
them, has not always been benevolent. This is a point which the literature on love for animals (e.g. 
the feminist literature and the marginalia considering love for animals in the analytic sources cited 
above) has not always appreciated. Thinking ourselves into their world has, historically, been tied 
to various sorts of dominance. Here we may think of Harry Harlow’s maternal deprivation 
experiments upon primates, one of Peter Singer’s classic early exemplars of a conspicuously cruel 
failure to appropriately value animal lives.17 These experiments were premised upon the reality of 
animal love and its importance. However, this is a cautionary note of a qualified sort given that the 
conception of love involved was radically reductionist. Love was attachment and little else. Harlow 
was in the business of levelling humans (and human love) down, rather than raising animals up. 
However, love also figures, in less reductionist ways, in the morally ambiguous literature on animal 
training (e.g. in Vicki Hearne) where dominance and affection are closely combined.18 Talk about 
love for and by animals may then be ethically significant, but it does not excuse all or lead us to 
forgive all. It does not the remove familiar ethical dilemmas about making sense of inequalities 
which are tolerable, perhaps unavoidable because of moral failures by prior humans, and those 
which are intolerable. To speak of love for and by animals still leaves a great deal unsaid about 
how an appreciation of such love might be taken up.  
On the side of a stronger and more positive connection between love and available forms 
of responsiveness, Raimond Gaita has suggested that nothing discloses value in the way that love does. 
‘Sometimes we see that it is precious only in the light of someone’s love for it’.19 Note, here, the 
more expansive conception of the objects of love or those things we may (defensibly) love. I can 
certainly understand why Gaita makes this claim. To see a being as lovable is to see the possibility 
of having relationships of depth with them.  But this does not involve the much stronger claim 
                                                           
17 Harry F. Harlow, ‘The Nature of Love’, American Psychologist 13 (1958), 673-85. 
18 Vicki Hearne, Adams Task: Calling Animals by Name. (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007).  
19 Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (Oxford: Macmillan, 1991), xxiv.  
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that only love can disclose value, or the idea that all of our failures are ultimately failures of love. It 
merely situates love in a distinctive and exemplary way: loving is valuing in its most obvious, 
tangible and motivating form. Here, I have also shifted from the familiar language associated with 
Kantian-inspired rights literature, the language of value, to the less metaphysically and theory-
loaded language of valuing. This may be an uncomfortable thought if we are reluctant to see 
emotion in general (not just love) as integral to ethics. Patterns of emotional responsiveness are, 
after all, integral to valuing, not just in the sense of being causally connected to it. Rather, a 
patterning of emotional response partly constitutes valuing and does not fall apart from it. And, in 
the case of non-humans, just as in the case of humans, the responsiveness which is constitutive of 
valuing generally (perhaps necessarily) begins with a responsiveness to particular others. This too 
will be a source of unease for at least some animal advocates who want one big concept, such as 
rights, to perform all or most of the ethical work of acknowledging that animals matter in some 
way which might help us to shape policy and law. Here, I will concede that, by contrast with love 
and emotion, rights talk generalises more easily and so is often a better fit for such discussions.  
If some particular being has rights r1,…,rn by virtue of having properties p1,…,pn, then any 
other being with the same properties to at least the same degree will ordinarily also be entitled to 
these same rights. Love, by contrast, does not carry over in quite the same way. A person who 
loves their dog does not necessarily love all dogs, let alone all animals with various comparable 
properties which are possessed to comparable degrees. A person who says that they are an ‘animal 
lover’ does not literally mean that they love each and every individual creature: rats and rhinos, 
foxes and flamingos. They mean something more restrictive. Unless we are carried away by 
partisanship, we will recognise that there is no hypocrisy here, any more than there is hypocrisy 
when I say that I love Suzanne but not Angela, Pamela, Sandra or Rita. Love may then seem to 
provide a hopeless inroad to any truly general form of ethical concern for animals and the political 
domain where such concern feeds through into legislation and norms.  
Yet, curiously, with non-humans, as with humans, the transition from caring for the 
particular being to broader forms of concern has been accomplished on many occasions. Indeed, 
for those who reach the point of a more generalised care (valuing) this is perhaps the normal 
pathway. It may even be the only pathway for psychologically typical agents. Our deepest concern 
for others, i.e. the concern most likely to motivate action, always seems to begin with love for 
discrete particular others. And, however partially it does so, such love breaks the egocentricity 
upon which so much harm to others depends. There may then be no necessary conceptual 
relationship between loving discrete particular others and the valuing of all other creatures, but there 
is often a close causal relationship. If our concern is ultimately for animals themselves, rather than 
conceptual connectivity, this can be just as important.  
This will leave love in play within the political domain, even when the language of rights 
does happen to be more convenient or does happen to take precedence. And I will close out this 
discussion with a cautionary tale about what happens when we lose sight of this. What happens is 
that we risk lapsing into ‘moral schizophrenia’, a condition in which our motivations for actions and 
justifications for actions fall apart, with justifications often then given primacy.20 Typically, agents 
such as myself come to advocate animal rights, and various changes in the anthropocentric order 
of things, in response to cruelty, the experience of loving particular animals, and out of some level 
of imperfect care and compassion. We come to value the lives of animals without any special 
theory about why we ought to do so. The justifications which we then learn to offer as the only 
truly legitimate non-sentimental reason for valuing are, however, of a very different sort. They 
often proceed by appeal to a set of problematic analogies with acknowledged prejudices and claims 
                                                           
20 Michael Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, The Journal of Philosophy, 73.14 
(1976), 453-66. 
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of a metaphysical sort about a concept of inherent value. Such theories do something. They have 
a place. But that place cannot be everywhere. It has little role to play when trying to make sense of 
why we are motivated to become involved in animal advocacy in the first place. Accordingly, if 
there is such a thing as an ethics of activism and dissent, it ought surely to be part of such an ethics 
that we try to avoid becoming too dependent upon such theories, and too divided in our 
motivations and justifications. Such a division can, after all, tend to cover over our own deepest 
concerns, concealing them from others and from ourselves.  
 
